We exhibit randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) algorithms achieving optimal running time and fault tolerance against all types of adversaries ever considered in the lit terature. Our BA algorithms do not require trusted parties, preprocessing, or non-consnuctive arguments. 
Introduction
The problem of Byzantine Agreement (&4) was introduced by Pease, Shostak and Lamport [PSL] . It may be the most important problem in distributed computation among fallible processors. Faulty behavior may range from "simple' ' mistakes to to,tal breakdown to skillful adversarial intent. Trying to maintain a "common view of the world" is difficult when one does not know whom to trust. BA is a key step in this direction: it enables all good processors (those which follow the protocol) to coordinate themselves. Consider a situation in which each processor holds a value. Informally, for any initial set of values, BA should give us the following properties.
(1) Consietency: All good processors agree on the same value.
(2) Meeningfulneas: If all good processors started with the same value, then they agree on that value Moreover, these properties should hotd even if some processors are moliciousLy faulty, and try to ensure that they will not be satisfied. In general, good processors do not know which are the faulty processors Faulty processors may coordinate their messages in such a way as to try to mislead the good processors into disagreement.
In most situatrons for which BA is needed, the values to be agreed upon may have arbibrary length. Nevertheless, the problem of reaching Byzantine agreement on arbitrary values easily reduces to reaching agreement on binary values (Dolev [D] ); we define this latter problem as BA. 
Previous Solutions
The fundamental parameters of a BA protocol are n, the size of the network; and t, the maximum number of faulty processors. We shall focus on the most important and difficult case, in which t=B( n). We shall also adopt a worstcase analysis regarding the adueraary that may coordinate the faulty processors Enormous attention has been devoted to the BA problem. For deterministic protocols, Pease, Shostak and Lamport [PSL] prove that no BAP can tolerate n/3 faults. They also show that BA can be reached in t+l rounds for any t < n /3, but using exponential communication. Dolev, Fischer, Fowler, Lynch and Strong IDFFLS] present an O(t) round RAP with polynomialiy bounded communication for any t <n/3.
Fischer and Lynch [FL] show that t+l rounds is a lower bound on the running time of any deterministic BAP. Thus, we must resort to probabilistic solutrons for faster running times Randomization for reaching BA was first used by Ben-Or [B] and then perfected by Rabin [R] using the idea of a common coin, a tool that has been essential to all subsequent solutions. Rabin's protocol, and subsequent protocols of Bracha [Br) and Feldman and Micali [FM] , grve fast agreements once the network has been suitably initialized Ben-Or's protocol, and subsequent protocols of Chor and Coan [CC] and D work, Shmoys and Stockmeyer [DSS] require no mrtialrzatron. but these are not fast for the case t=0( n). The most general and Interesting problem, reaching fast BA "from scratch" for t=8( n), is not solved by any previous algorithm.
our R.eY3u1t
We exhibit protocols to reach BA from scratch in constant expected time, tolerating (a-1)/3 faults. Our protocols simultaneously achieve optimal running time (up to a constant) and optimal fault tolerance; this follows from the result of Karlin and Yao {KY] , who extend the bound of (PSLI to show that even probabilistrc BA protocols cannot tolerate n/3 bad processors.
Given private channels, our protocols are noncryptographic, and withstand even an adversary WIQJ infinrte computing power.
Asynchronous extensions of our protocols also run in constant expected trme. For a network with private channels, wrthout cryptography, t<n/4 faults may be tolerated.
Using cryptography, and sesummg a computationally-bounded adversary, we regain optimal fault tolerance, t<n/3. In Section 7, we show how to compile any protocol assuming private channels to a cryptographic protocol not assuming prrvate channels which runs exactly the same. Our compiled BA algorithms are optimal in the cryptographic setting. This follows from the result of Dolev and Dwork (DDI, who extend the result of (KY] to the setr ting in which cryptography may be used against a polynomial-time adversary. They show that n/3 faulty processors may not be tolerated, unless the network has previously agreed on public keys for signatures For the cryptographic scenario in which the netr work has previously agreed on public keys for signatures, an extension of our algorithm reaches BA in constant expected time whenever the majority of processors are good.
A Bird-Eye Mew of Our Algrithm
The main ideas of our solution are briefly described below
The first ingredient of our protocol is the constant round Crusader Agreement protocol of Dolev [D] . We mtroduce here a somewhat stronger variant of this protocol, called the Graded Broadcast protocol. This protocol guarantees that if a player P sends a messsge to all the players then 4 If P was good then all good players agree on that message, and b) Even if P was bad then if any good player accepts the message then all the other players receive only the same message, ( but may or may not accept it).
As in (D 1, graded broadcast can be reached in constant number of rounds The full description of this protocol appears in section 4.1.
The second important component of our protocol 1s the Graded Verrfieble Secret Shoring protocol described in section 4.2. Here again, in constant number of rounds, we give a verifiable secret sharing protocol such that if player P distributes a secret to all the players then
1)
If P is good then all the good players agree that a good secret has been shared, and
2) Even if P was bad, if any good player accepts the secret as a good secret then all the good players know that there is some well defined secret and they each know their share of this secret Furthermore, the secret is recoverable from these shares.
This protocol is based on the graded broadcast protocol, and on a simplification of the recent VSS algorithms of Ben-Or, Goldwssser and Widgewrson [BGV and Chaum, Crepeau,and Damgaard [CCD] .
The most crucial idea in our BA protocol is the way we use these two protocols to produce a Common Random Coin. We do this by running an election where each player is assigned a random number in the range IO,n-11, and the player with the smallest number is selected. As our common random coin we can take the parity of this smallest number. To guarantee that the number assigned to each player P is indeed random, all the players participate in the choice if this number. Each player selects a secret random number and uses the Graded-VSS protocol to share its pieces among the other players. At this point our player P selects at least n-t such secrets that he has accepted, and announces his selection using the graded broadcast protocol. As P-s number we take the sum of the secrets he selected modulo n. This is done concurrently for each player P. A good player will accept P-s selection only if it knows that all tie secrets selected are well defined.
At this point all the shares of the secrets are opened, the secrets are recovered and our common random coin is determined. Note that if P is a good player then the secrets he inctudes in his number are known to all the players and they are all recoverable. Therefore P-s random number IS well defined. If P is bad his number may not be well defined if it includes non-recoverable secrets. A good player will accept P-s selection only if all the secrets he has selected are recoverable, therefore, if all the good players that do accept P-s choice get the same value. Note that each accepted choice contains at least n-t recoverable secrets, some of which where selected randomly by good players and hence the number ,wsrgned b P is random Since all the number assigned to all the players are random, with probability at least l-t/n a good player's value will be the minimum. In this case all l;he players have the same minimal number and therefore the same common coin. In the unlucky case where a bad player draws the minimal number some of the players may not receive this number and may come up with a different coin. Since this happens only with probability less than t/n this 'commoncoin' is good enough for our BA protocol.
As seen above our new protocol relies heavily on many ideas that have been developed over the past few years by many researchs in both FaultTolerance and Cryptography. Our protocol would probably not come about without this important and rich background. In our introduction we mention some of these previous results but fall far short of at full review. For ain excellent review we refer the reader to [CD] 
Model of Computation
We consider a network N of R processors, or players, with identities 1,2,.. ,n, where n>4. Each processor is an intera ctiue pro b o b &tic polynomial-,time Turing macliine. The network is complete with private channels, i.e. each pair of processors may send messages to each other which cannot be read by any other party. We assume a synchronou.~ network. This says that all communications are sent during time intervals defined by pulses of a clock accessible to all players. Any message sent between the d-th and d+lst pulses (the d-th round) is received at the d+l-st puise.
Player i is considered good as long as he has followed the protmol.
In other words, i execur&d his program properly and wrote the values returned in the proper places at the proper time. Processor i is considered faulty, or bud, once it has deviated from the protocol. The most general (and difficult to overcome) kind of faulty behavior occur when the faulty processors are selected and coordinated by an adversary.
Informally, an adversary is an algorithm which may "act on" a network running a protocol and can corrupt a fixed fraction of the processors.
Definition 2: Let A be a probabilistic algorithm; let r be a constant. We say that A is an t-adversary if A may act on any network of n processors, running any protocol (or sequence of protocols) P, a5 follows:
(1) Every communication link which is not a private channel is readable by A.
(2) A may corrupt any t<r.n processors: when A corrupts processor i, A gets read privileges on all of i's tapes and seizes exclusive-write control of i's output tapes.
(3) Dynamiciry: A may corrupt processors at arbitrary points during P.
(4) Rushing: A reads the d-th round messages sent over non-private channels and d-th round private channel messages sent to bad players durmg the d-th round itself.
On the b;wts of these messages, A may corrupt additional processors during round d (but not more than 1 overall) A also reads the d-b round messages sent to the newly corrupted processors during round d This process continues until A decides not to corrupt any more processow (or has already corrupted t). A need not select the round-d messages that bad players send to good players until just before the d+l-st pulse (5) A can perform an unlimited number of computa tional steps instantaneously.
Remark 1: We shall consider the tesJiency of a protocol, r, to be the greatest fraction of bad players it can tolerate. That is, P is r-resilient if the defining properties of P are satisfied when any r-adversary acts on P. This makes no claims regarding what happens when a more powerful adversary acts on P. When we mention an (unspecified) adversary acting on P, any statements made need only apply to an r-adversary, where r IS the resilience of P.
Verifiable Secret Sharing
Verifiable secret sharing IS a very useful and powerful protocol. It is designed for a network in which each processor has a broadcast channel, an output tape whose contents are read by all processors. We shall define and present a weaker version of verifiable secret sharing which does not require broadcast channels. In this section, in which we briefly survey the development of veriEable secret sharing, we shall assume broadcast channels. (We also retain the assumption that the net work is complete with private channels.)
Secret Sharing
The simpler concept of secret sharing was introduced by Shamir [S] and independently by Blakely [BI] . Simply stated, secret sharing allows a distinguished processor, the dealer, to give a "time-release" message to a network of n processors, at most t of which may be bad. We shall assume that t <n/2.
A secret sharing is a pair of protocols to be run in order, (.Share,Recouer) .
In Share, the dealer privately sends a piece of a secret message to each processor. Each processor saves the piece he receives as a private input to Recover. Any piece, by itself, is useless; in fact, any collection of t pieces provides no information about the secret. However, any n-t players, by running Recover, can recover the secret. If t is the bound on the number of bad players, then we see that the secret may not be recovered without the cooperation of (at least) one good player. By contrast, the pieces of the good players alone determine the secret.
Shamir [S] presents an elegant secret sharmg scheme To share a secret :I, the dealer uniformly chooses a t-th degree polynomial, S, whose constant term, S( 0), is s. (All calculations are done in Z,, a finite field of p elements, for a prtme p >n) ' Processor i I Notice that there is a l/p chance that the leading ~~C~WAS the value of S evaluated at i, i e , S(i), as his piece of the secret, and saves this as his private input to Recover. In Recover. all good players broadcast their pieces. Using polynomial interpolation, it is easy to find S, and hence s, from the first t+l pieces (actually, any set of t-t1 pieces may be used).
We sketch a proof that the adversary can not predict the secret better than randomly before the good players run Recover. That is, if the adversary outputs a value uEZ, before Recover is run, the probability that the good ptayers output aA at the end of Recoucr IS I/P The ret-on for tbrs 1s that the pieces of the brui playem alone specify neither S nor 8 In fact, the meres of bad players are unrformly distributed, Independent of the secret. This is because the dealer chose S unrformly; for any s, for any t-tuple of bad players, {j,,...,jt}, for any t-tuple of elements of the field {q,,...,~~}, there is a unique t-th degree polynomral S such that S(O)=8 and S(jf) for any secret, there are pfwd polynomials consistent with the secret and the pieces of any d bad players: smce all polynomtals were equally lrkely ta be chosen, the secret IS independent of the preces of the bad players.
There are two potential problems with this scheme.
(1) Non-eziatence o/ secret: When the deafer IS bad, the pieces he gives might not lie on a t-th degree polynomial. In thus case, the secret is not even defined; any two sets of t+l pieces, when rnterpolated, could yield different values for S( 0).
(2) Dirty pieced: Even when the dealer is good, and prop erly shared a secret 8, bad players may interfere with good players trying to recover the secret. The interpolatton used to recover the secret requires that all valuations of the polynomial are correct. If a single value is wrong, then the interpolation will give the wrong result. Good players, without knowing S, cannot distinguish correct values from incorrect values Therefore, if bad players broadcast incorrect values, good players may use them in lbca Interpolation nnd get the wrong result Rclnerk 3 When /-.. n/cl, the srrrct "shInas through" the dirty pwes. hut, It. may he mteas\ble to recover It If the dealer shared properly, then during the recovery prot0c,oi. :lt, le:r.st II-t good players broadcast good pieces lyrng on the t-th degree polynomial actually shared Smce at most f of these may lie on any other t-th coefficient of S is 0; "I-th degree polynomial" shall refer to a polynomial of degree at most 1. degree polynomial, regardless of what the bad players broadcast, at most 2t pieces overall may lie on any other polynomial. Since n >3t, the correct polynomial interpolates 2t+l of. the announced pieces; this condition uniquely defines the correct polynomiat, and hence the secret. Unfortunately, when t= O(n), this polynomial may be hard to find; a random set of t+l players consists entirely of good players with probability which vanishes exponentially In n When t 2 n/3, the secret is not even determined by n pieces, 1 of which are incorrect, and hence no amount, of computation can guarantee recovery If cryptography rrray be used, signalurea could overcome the problem of dirty preces, but does not guard agamst non-exlstence of the secret. To prevent duty pieces, a good dealer signs all pieces of the secret. When the secret is to be recovered, any piece with an invalid slgnature is Ignored; only good pieces, actually given by the dealer, are used to recover the secret. This does not guarantee existence of the secret, since a bad dealer may sign pieces which do not lie on a t-th degree polynomial. Moreover, even if the dealer was good when he shared the secret but was later corrupted, he may alter/invalidate the secret he shared by giving alternate, signed pieces to bad players, who broadcast these new pieces when recovery is attempted.
Verifiable
Secret Sharing (With Bmadcast Channels) Chor, Goldwasser, Micali, and Awerbuch [ CGMA) introduced the notion of verifiable secret sharing (VSS). This IS an "enriched" secret sharing free of the prob lems mcntloned above. In addition to the shatrng and recovery protocols, there is a decision protocol, to be run after the sharing protocol, in which the players decide whether or not the secret is well-defined. The decision protocol must not enable the adversary to advantageously predict the secret. The recovery protocol must guarantee, with a high level of confidence, that any well-defined secret is recovered, no matter what the bad players do.
We shall only use VSS in situations in which the secret to be shared was randomly selected from an interval. This enables us to simplify our definition. be a triple of protocols to be executed in order on a broadcast net work, having four common inputs: w; the identity of the dealer, h; a confidence parameter, k ; and the number of possible secrets, m. The dealer has a private input, 8, a value chosen uniformly from IO,m-11. Player i outputs "Accept" or "Reject" at the end of Decide, he outputs an element of (0, tn -11, a,, at the end of Recover F is a VSS if the followmg properties are satisfied:
(1) ( Unann-nIty) All good players terminate Decide with a common output (Accept/Reject) (2) (Acceptance of good secrets) If the dealer is good through the end of Decide, then all good players terminate Decide by accepting.
(3) (Recoverability) With probabihty at least l-2-', at the end of Decide, there exists a value vE(O,m-l] such that each good player i that accepts will set u,=:u as his output for Recover. Whenever I is good throughout Decide, for each good player i, a,=5.
(4) (Unpredictability) Let A be an adversary acting on P which outputs a value uE [O,m-l] as its prediction of the secret, before Recover is run. On executions in which h is good through the end of Decide, the probability that A's prediction is correct (i.e., ,u=s) is between .99/m and 1.01/m. Remark 4: We have adopted the simplest definition which is general enough to apply to all applications of VSS appearmg in this paper. For non-cryptographic schemes, the probability that A correctly predicts the secret is, in fact, exactly l/m. For cryptographic schemes, this probability is essentially l/m, By our convention, a VSS P is r-resilient if these properties are satisfied for any r-adversary acting on P.
Chor, Goldwasser, Micatii, and Awerbuch [ CGMA] gave the first of various cryptographic VSS schemes. Based on a cryptographic assumption, they present a VSS with resiliency ( I/logn). Benrlloh [Be] , Goldreich, Micah and Wigderson (GMW] , and Feldman [F] gave cryptographic I/2-resilient VSS schemes. Chaum, Crepeau and Damgaard (CCD] , end independently Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson [IBGW] found the first noncryptographic VSS schemes, This breakthrough shows that private channels are a sufficient assumption to allow VSS; as a result, we are able to present BA protocols free of cryptography and unproven assumptions. which tolerate up to (n-1)/3 bad processors.
Zero-knowledge proof techniques, as introduced by (GMR] , may be used to ensure that the secret IS welldefined. Benaloh [Be] was the first to design a VSS based on this observation; the protocols of [CCD] is a clever extension of his method. (BGW] sh0.w how to combine Shamir's (non-verifiable) secret sharing with techniques from error correcting codes to o'btain non cryptographic VSS. A secret is identified with tile polynomial used to share it (es in Shamir's scheme [S] ). Besides sharing the main secret S, the dealer shares pairs of test secrets ( T., T.+S)
These have the property that if S is not properly shared, at least one of each pair of test secrets is not properly shared. The playen randomly pick one test secret of each pair to be revealed. A good dealer "passes" without revealing anything about S; a bad dealer who did not share the main secret properly is caught with overwhelming probability. The problem of dirty pieces is solved using error correcting codes. In section 3.2.1 we present a simplification of their method which uses (as they do) broadcast channels. As we want to use VSS towards reaching BA, we have to change this algorithm to work without broadcast channels We do this in section 4.2.
A Simple VSS (Using Broadcast
Channels)
We present a l/4-resilient VSS which we call SimpleVS.9.
(In the full palper, we present a noncryptographic, l/3-resilient VSS in which every accepted secret is recoverable; the improved protocol does not rely on error correcting code techniques.) We shall assume that the confidence parameter, k, is at least 4; we set K==kn. Simp[eVSS requires two extra parameters: a prime p, such that p > m and p~--l mod n; and a primitive n-th root of unity mod p, w. (I.e., w*=l mod p, w6#l mod p for d<n.) All calculations are done in Z,. For simplicity, we consider p and w ta be common inputs.
To simplify analysis of protocols, we assume that whenever processor i should perform an mstruct*ion for all j, t,hts includes j==i. For example. when i sends a message to all players, he also sends a message to himself; any count of how many processors sent a certam message to i will include i (when applicable) A dishnguished processor follows the code for all players in addition to his special code.
Any step of a protocol (e.g , the last) that consists solely of internal computation does not require a separate round, as it may be merged with the next round (e.g., of any subsequent protocol), Accordingly, such steps receive labels such as "Step 1.5".
Protacoi SimpleShare
Common Inputs: n,t<n/4,h,k,m,p,w Extra Private Input for Dealer h: 8, a random value in (0, m-11 Private input for Every Player i. None
Step 1: (Dealer Only) Uniformly pick a t-th degree polynomial S such that S(O)=a.
Uniformly and independently pick t-th degree polynomials T,,..., TK. For each i, send S( tu'), ?'i( w'), .., TK( w') on the prrvate channel to player i. Save these polynomrals as retained private input to SimpLeDecide.
Step 1.5: (Every Player i) Let S,,tr Step 1: (Every Player i) Randomly pick it bits, Q,,QI+,l...,Q~-m+,.
Broadcast(i,Q,),...,(K-n+i,QK-.+,).
Step 2: (Dealer Only) For each l_</ <Kc: if (J, Q/r) was not properly broadcast, set Q/=0. If Q/=0, set P,=T,, if Q/=1, set P,=T,+S, broadcast P,.
Step 3: (Every Player i) For each proper ( /, Q,) broadcast in
Step I, check that h properly broadcast a t-th degree polynomial P, and that P,( w')=t,+Q,.S,.
If all of these check, broadcast "Goodpiece"; otherwise, set s, =a
Step 3.5: (Every Player i) If at least n-t players broadcast "Goodpiece", output "Accept"; otherwise, output "Reject". Save S, as a retained private input to SimpleRecover.
F%dncol SimpleRecover (Retained) Common Inputs: n,t<n/4,m,p,w (Retained) Private Input for Every Player i, S,
Step 1: (Every Player i) Send (i,S,) to all players
Step 1.5: (Every Player i) Let the set of recerved pieces be { ( l,d,) ,...,( n,&)), where d,=B if nothing was received from player i. Find (using standard error correcting code techniques) the unique t-th degree polynomial U interpolating at least n-2t of the points ( wJ)d,) (if none exists, ll=O), Let a, be U(0) reduced ' mod m. Output a,.
Theorem 1: SimpleVSS is a l/Cresilient VSS Proof: Property (I), unanimity, holds because acceptance depends only upon the number of messages "Goodpiece"; these are broadcast, so all players receive the same number of them.
Property (2), acceptance of good secrets, holds because a good dealer follows the protocol, so every good player broadcasts "Goodpiece".
We preface the proof of property (3), recoverability, by a brref discussion of error correcting code techniques (Peterson and Weldon [PW'] ).
The most common application of error correcting codes arises when we wish to transmit codewords (messages of a specml form) over an unreliable channel. Sup pose that all possible codewords have c bits, and any two possible codewords differ in at least 2d-te+l bit positions. If at most d bits are switched (flipped) by the channel, and e are not transmitted at all, then when we send a codeword, it IS the cloueat codeword to the string actually received. i.e , it is the only codeword that can be derived by flipping at most d bits and filling in at most e more. Error correcting codes provide a polynomial time algorithm to find the closest codeword. A similar technlque may be used when codewords consist of c-tuples of values mod p. If any two codewords differ in at least Zd+e+l values, then we may recover a codeword even if d of the values are Incorrect and e are missing. For our application, c= n and d= t A codeword is a t-th degree polynomial evaluated at the n-th roots of unity. Any two codewords may agree in at most t positions, hence they disagree in at least 3t+l. Therefore, the above technique may be used to recover a polynomial from its values at the n-th roots of unity, if at most t of these values are incorrect and another t are missing.
We now show the followmg lemma Lemma 2: When SimpleDecide is run following an execution of SimpleShare, with probability at least l-2-', 3 A bad dealer may have picked S such that S(O)Lm.
either (a) The secret is rejected, OR (b) The main pieces (i.e., of the main secret) of all good players that broadcast "Goodpiece" lie on a t-th degree polynomial. Proof: Let us consider, after the termination of SimpleDetide, the probability that the secret is accepted and the main pieces of all good players that broadcast "Goodpiece" do not lie on a t-th degree polynomial. Let G be any fixed set of n-2 t players which were good through the end of SimpleDecide. We analyze the probability that all players in G broadcast "Goodpiece" Let CJ denote the minimum degree polynomial Interpolating the main pieces of players in G; let CJ, denote the minimum degree polynomial interpolating G's pieces of the /-th test secret. Suppose that the degree of U is greater than t. Then for every /, either V, or fJ,+cI (or both) is not a t-th degree polynomial. Call Q, the J-th query bit We say Q, is lucky iff CJ,+Q,.U is a t-th degree polynomial. Say that a polynomial V fits a piece t/ held by player i ifi V( WI)*,.
If, during SimpleDecide, an unlucky query bit Q, was properly broadcast, then no matter what t-th degree polynomial the dealer revealed as PI, it did not fit the pieces of the I-th test secret of all members of G, and hence not all members of G broadcast "Goodpiece". Thus, either every properly broadcast query bit was lucky, or some member of G did not broadcast "Goodpiece". Each query bit picked by a member of G (or any good player) was picked randomly, and is lucky with probability l/2 (or 0, if neither choice is lucky). Since over half of the players are m G, they picked (and properly broadcast) over half of the query bits; the chance that all are lucky is at most 2-'"b.
We now observe that if the secret was accepted, at least n-2t players good through SimpleDecide broadcast "Goodpiece". We have just shown that the chance that any fixed set of n-2t players remain good and broadcast "Goodpiece", even though their main pieces do not lie on a t-th degree polynomial, is at most 2-'"fi We may overestimate the chance that such a set exists by multiplying by the number of sets of n-2t players, (aT2tj.
The product is (n-"2t)2-h"<2a2-~'/l=Z"t1-t/l)12-~ (for n 24, k 24). Finally, we observe that if neither (a) nor (b) is satisfied, such a set must exist; this proves the lemma. QED Consider the case when the secret is accepted and (b) occurs: that is, the main pieces of all satisfied good players (i.e., that broadcast "Goodpiece") lie on a f-th degree polynomial. Since there are at least n-2t satisfied good players, there is a unique such t-th degree polynomial, U. In this case, in SimpleRecover, at most t nonnull values broadcast (i.e , by bad players) may be Incorrect, and at most t good players may have broadcast 0. Therefore, the error correcting technique is guaranteed to return CJ for every good player. Notice that whenever h is good throughout SimpleDecide, all good players are satisfied and receivr 1~~~'~ 1:s of S, so S is returned.
For For any possible secret 8, there is a unique polynomial S fitting the main pieces of these t players such that S( 0) =: 8. S, in conjunction with A '3 view, determines each selected test polynomial, T,=Pf-Q/-S, which determines all test pieces. All good players broadcast "Goodpiece".
It follows that for any s, there is exactly one choice of polynomials S, Ti,..., TK which is consistent with A's view. Since all polynomials are chosen uniformly and independently, all secrets are equally likely, given A's view, so A cannot predict 8 other than randomly. (As before, if d < t players were corrupted, p'-' possible h'+l-tuples of polynomials correspond to each possible secret, so all are equally likely.) QED 4. Our BA Protocol
We shall prove two reductions. We show that BA is reducible to a common coin. In turn, a common coin is reducible to a btoadcustfree version of VSS. A. crucial step in the latter reduction and in the modified VSS itself is a weak method of simulating broadcasts.
A Graded-broadcast F'rimitive
A broadcast channel is a very ,useful feature in a network; a processor receiving a message on a broadcast channel is guaranteed that all other processors are receiving the same message. Broadcast channels may be used for much more than VSS; in particular, it is trivial to reach BA in a broadcast network, e.g., each processor broadcasts his input value, then outputs the malority value broadcast (with, say, default 0 in case of a tie). We shall define a Graded-broad'cast primitive, which is nearly as powerful as a broadcast channel, and shall use it as a stepping stone towards BAA.
Crusader agreement, as introduced by Dolev [D] and refined by Turpin and Coan [TC] , simulates an unreliable broadcast channel. Basically, sending a message using Crusader agreement, is like sending a message on a broadcast channel in which some messages may not get delivered: recipients of the message are guaranteed that all other recipients receive the same messages However, recipients have no guarantee that any other player receives the message. We introduce Graded-broadcast to partially resolve this problem As in Crusader agreement, for any message sent using Graded-broadcast, all received messages are the same. The added feature is that when a good player sends a message using Gradedbroadcaet, all good players can verify that all good players receive the same message, Step 1: (Sender Only) Distribute u
Step 2: (Every Flayer i) Let V, denote the Step 1 message received from h. Distribute V,.
Step 3: (Every Player i) If a common string 2 was received as the Step 2 message of at least n-t players, distribute Z; otherwise, send no messages.
Step 3.5, (Every Player i) Let taNy, denote the number of players that sent 2 to i in Step Proof: We first show that u&e, is well defined in Step 3.5 The key to proving this is showing that if g and j are good players that distribute X and Y respectively at Step 3, then X= Y We show this by a simple counting argument. Assume that at least n-t players send X to g in Step 2. Suppose w of these players are bad, where w 5 t, so at least n-t-w good players send X in Step 2. Therefore, at most (n-w)-( n-t--w)=t good players can distribute any other value at Step 2. Thus, if X+ Y, at most t good players and hence most 2t players overall send Y to j in Step 2. Since t<n,'3, 2t<n-t, so if j is good, he does not distribute Y in Step 3.
We have shown that that all good players that distribute in Step 3 are distributing a common message X. Thus, any Y#X may be distributed only by bad players, and hence value, IS well defined m Step 3.5. Moreover, any good i that decides according to 3.5a or 3.5b will set ualue,=X, proving property ( 1) of Definition 4. Property (2) follows from the fact that if any good player i ends with code,=2, this implies that at least 2ttl players send X to i in Step 3, and at least t+l of these players are good, so all good players receive X from at least t+l players, so they aft decide according to 3Sa or 3.5b. hoperty (3) is easily verified, since if h is good, all good players receive and redistribute cr in Steps 2 and 3. QED In general, when a protocol instructs h to distribute V, it would be misleading to let V denote the message i receives, since this suggests that every good player receives the same value. When h is instructed to broadcast V, we have seen that this notation is justified, since we may define V to be whatever h broadcast. When a protocol instructs n t6 Grade-Cast V, we shall likewise let V denote the unique non-null output value, of any good player i (if one exists). A player rejecting the Grade- Casf does not output this value (but rather 0 ), but such a player never accesses V in any case.
Graded Verifiable Secret Sharing
Our definition of VSS required that all good processors reach a common decision regarding the accepb+ bility of a secret; for this, broadcast channels (or BA) were needed. Obviously, we cannot use VSS as a tool to reach BA! Fortunately, we find that a weaker version of VSS which does not require broadcast channels is sufficient to help reach BA in constant expected time. We call this weaker version Graded-VSS, for in it, the players reach a graded decision (as in Grade-Cast) . A player may accept, semi-accept, or reject the secret, A player that semi-accepts has concluded that the dealer is bad, but nevertheless knows that the secret is recoverable. Graded-VSS retains all the properties of VSS, with the exception of unanimily, which is weakened to semiunanimity: if any good player accepts, all good players acknowledge, Definition 8: Let P=( Share, Graded-Decide, Recover) be a triple of protocols to be executed in order on a neb work, having four common inputs: n; the identity of the dealer, h; a confidence parameter, k; and the number of possible secrets, m. The dealer has a private input, 8, a value chosen uniformly from [O,m-11. Each player i outputs accept, E {0,1,2} at the end of Graded-Decide, and outputs a,, an element of [O,m-l] at the end of Recover. We call P a Graded-VS.9 if the following properties are satisfied:
(1') (Semi-unanimity) If any good player i sets accept,=2, each good player j sets accept,>O.
(2) (Acceptance of good secrets) If the dealer is good, then each good player i sets accept,=2.
(3) (Recoverability) With probability at least 1-2-', at the end of Graded-Decide, there existe a value uElO, such that each good player i for which acccpt,>O, will set a,==~ es his output for Recauer. Whenever h is good throughout Graded-Decide, for each good player i, a,= J. (4) (Unpredictability) Let A be an adversary acting on P which outputs a value vE\O,m-11 as its prediction of the secret, before Recouer IS run. On executions In which h is good through the end of Graded-Decide, the probability that A's prediction is correct (~.e., ua) is between .99/m and 1 01/m.
The Graded-VSS protocol we exhibit below is based on SimpieVSS. However, there are two key differences:
(1) The employment of Grade-Coat in place of broadCaStS.
(2) The branched responses to Grade-Caets in the decision protocol.
We briefly discuss these changes, The power of broadcast channels guaranteed that for any good processors h and i, for every broadcast received by i, h received the same broadcast. For any broadcast requiring a specific response --for example, in SimpleDecide, the dealer reveals test polynomials corresponding to the broadcast of query bits --if h does not give the proper response, i concludes that h is faulty. What happens without broadcast channels?
Consider the following attempt to simulate broadcast channels. In place of an instruction to broadcast V, we substitute an instruction to distribute V, followed by a Crusader agreement on the vatue distributed. Although this would guarantee that i would not receive a different value than h, it is possible that i would receive a value, and h would receive nothing. Thus, a nonresponse from h proves nothing; this attempted simulation fails. A proper substitution of Grade-Cast instructions, with branched responses, (as in Steps 2 and 3 of the following protocol) will succeed; the three-level acceptance code is the crucial feature. It guarantees that any Grade-Cast acepted by i is acknowledged by h Consider any response h is required to make to a proper broadcast in VSS. If, in Graded-V%, the corresponding Grade-Cast is accepted by any good player i, then h acknowledges the same Grade-Caet, and makes the appropriate response. A Grade-Cast semi-accepted by i did not come from a good player, and hence h (who may not have acknowledged such a Grade-Cast) is not penalized for not responding.
We obtain a broadcastfree VSS, FreeVSS, by prop erly modifying SimpieVSS. SimpleShare and SimpleRecover, which do not use broadcasts, are unchanged. 'The only changes are in SimpleDecide. There are three reasons why we only have semi-unanimity. Firstly, players may differ slightly on the acceptability of Crude-Casts of the dealer. Secondly, players may disagree on whether or not a query vector was acceptably Grade-Cast. Thirdly, players may disagree on which pllllyc1.3 distributed "Goodpiece 'I.
Recall, from SimpleShare, that h is the dealer, k is the confidence parameter, Kd:n, m is the range of possible secrets, p is a prime congruent to I mod n, and w is a primitive n-th root of 1 mod p; all calculations are tn Step 1: (Every Player i) Randomly pick k query bits, Q ,,..,, QK-,,+,. Grade-Caat( i,Q,) ,..., (K-n+i, QK-.+,).
Step 2: (Dealer Only) For llf SK: if the Grade-Cast of (/,Q/) was acknowledged, set R/==Q,; otherwise, set R,=O. Let PI= T,+R,.S.
Grade-Cast P,,...,PK.
Step 3: (Every Player i) Check that h's Grade -Caef is accepted and proper.
For each proper, accepted Grade-Cast of (f,Q/) (from Step I), check that PI is a t-th degree polynomial, and I",( w')==t/+Q/.S,.
If these all check, distribute "Goodpiece"; otherwise, reset $4
Step 4: (Every Player i) If at least n-t messages "Goodpiece" were received, distribute "Recoverable"
Step 4.5: (Every Player i) (a) If at least 2t+1 messages "Recoverable" were received, set eccepti=2.
(b) If between t+l and 2f messages "Recoverable" were received, set accept,= 1.
(c) Otherwise, set accept,==O.
Output ucccpti. Save S, as private input to ,PimpleRecover.
Theorem 4: FreeVSS is a I/4-resilient Graded-V%.
Proof: Property ( 1') (semi-unanimity) is immediate, since if any good player accepts, he received at least 2t+l "Recoverable"s, so all players received at least t+l "Recoverable"~, so they all acknowledge.
For properties (2), (3), and (4), we can apply the same proof used for SimpleVSS, by checking that the substitution of Grade-Casts for broadcasts suffices. For property (2) (acceptance of good secrets), the crucial fact is that if h and i are good, any proper Crude-Coat of Q, accepted by i is acknowledged by h, and hence properly answered by h, so i broadcasns "Goodpiece".
In the proof of property (3) (recoverability), we only used the fact that if the dealer failed to properk respond to a query bit of a good player, then no good player sends "Goodpiece".
This IS also true for FreeVSS, since all good players accept the Grade-Cast of ev,ery query bit of every good player.
Property (4) (unpredictability) still holds, since, as in SimpleVSS, the view of any r-adversary is determined by values with a uniform distribution independent of 8. We shall refer to an execution of Share and Graded-Decide as a stored aceret A sbred secret is recoverable iff at least one good processor acknowledged, and unrecoverable otherwise. A stored secret is truty recoverable if the event of property (3) Rabin [R] shows that BA is constant-expected-time reducible to a common coin (to be formally defined below). Intuitively, a common coin may be viewed as a random, unpredictable bit which, somehow, suddenly becomes a common input of all players. For example, the parity of the Monday's market closing (Dow Jones average) is reasonably unpredictable on Monday morning, but anyone may easily read it in Tuesday's newspaper. This bit need not be perfectly random and unpredictable, as shown by the reduction below. Definition 7. Let P be a protocol with common input n and no private inputs. Each processor i outputs a bit d,. We say that P is a common coin protocol if for a constant p >0, for any bit b, with probability at least p, d,= b for all good processors i. (We say p is the f aimeas of P.)
The following theorem adapts the ideas of Rabin [R) and subsequent papers to our scenario.
Theorem 6: Let P be a common coin protocol of fairness p. Then there exists a protocol Qp with the following properties:
(1) The common input is n; each player i has a private input bit B, and outputs a bit b,. (4) The running time of Qp exceeds that of P by 1 round; if P is r-resilient, then the resilience of Qp IS min( 1/3,r).
Effectively, an execution of & reaches BA with probability at least p; if the network starts Qp in agreement, it stays in agreement.
Pmof: Consider the following protocol. The common input is n. Each player i has a private input bit B, and outputs a bit bf.
Common Inputs:n,t<n/3 Private Input for Every Player i: 8,, a bit
Step 1: (Every Player i) Distribute B,. Step 2: (Every Player i) For each j, let c, be the bit received from j in Step 1 (0, if R nroper message was not received). Let count, denote the tiuniber of j such that c,= 1. Run P; let d be the output. We first observe that if B,=O for all good players i, then for every good player j, count,<t, hence j sets b,=O in Step 2a. Likewise, if B,=l for all good players i, then for every good player j, count,2n-t, hence j sets b,= 1 in Step 2b This proves property (2). Notice that for any Br ,..., B,, for any good i and j, (count,-count, 1st. Therefore, if i executes Step 2a, j cannot execute Step 2b. Thus, all good players that execute Step 2a or 2b are executing the same Step, and out put a common bit b. This b is determined by the values distributed at Step 1. With probability at least p, all good processors end P with output b, in which case all good processors end &p with output 6. (If no good processor executes 2a or Ib, then all good processors end Qp with a common bit iff they end P with a common bit, which has probability at least 2p.) This proves property (3). Properties ( I) and (4) follow by inspection. QED
We have shown how to reach BA with a positive, constant probability; moreover, the protocol guarantees that if the network started in agreement, it stays in agreement. We may iterate this procedure: namely, the processors may repeatedly run Qp, using their outputs of the o-th execution as their private inputs to the u+l-st execution. If the good pIayers reach agreement in any itere tion, agreement is always maintained. The probability that disagreement is maintained on any particular iteration is at most 1-p. Let the expected number of iterations until agreement is reached be X. Since each iteration IS the last with probability at least p, and these events are independent, X< 1+( l-p)X, so X< 1 /p, The probability that disagreement is maintained through k iterations vanishes exponentially ( is at most (I-p)&).
A BA Protoe
Unfortunately, iterating Qp does not produce a protocol satisfing our definition of a BA protocol. After any finite number of iterations, there is a non-zero probability that the network is still not in agreement. We remedy this by utilizing ptoo{a of agreement. Basically, we add steps to the protocol enabling processors to deduce that the network has reached agreement, at which point they can terminate. (For example, in Rabin's protocol [R), if processor I' tallies a strong majority for 1 and knows that that all good processors output 1 as the common coin, it knows that all good processors reset to 1,) Theorem 8: Let P be a common coin protocol Let F(n) be the running time of P when the common input is n. Then there exists a BA protocol BAp with expected running time O( F( n)). If P is r-resilient, then the resilience of BAp is min( 1/3,r).
Proof: Consider the following protocol. The common input is n. Each player I' has a private input bit B, and outputs a bit b,.
-1 BAp
Common Inputs:n,t<n/3 Rivate Input for Every Player i: E,, a bit
Step .5: For every 15 jsn, initialize c,=O.
Step 1: Distribute B,.
Step 2: For each j, if j sent a bit in Step 1, reset c, to that bit. Let count, denote the number of j such that c,= 1. Run P; let d be the output. Step 3: Distribute 8,.
Step 3.5: For each j, if j sent a bit in Step 3, reset c, to that bit, Let count, denote the number of j such that c,=l. Step 4: Distribute B,.
Step 4 Return to Step 1.
Step 5: Distribute B,. Let 6,=B,. Output b,. Terminate
We recall the defining properties of a BA protocol.
( 1) For any two good processors i and j, d,= d,.
(2) If b,= b, for all good processors i, j, then for each good processor i, d, = 6,.
All good processors which have not branched to
Step 5 are all in the same Step. Notice that if at the beginning of Step 1,3, or 4, for any bit b, if B,=b for each good processor i, then every good processor i keeps B,= b for the entire protocol, and all good processors will branch to Step 5 and output b during the next iteration. Property (2) follows immediately.
To show (l), consider the network at the earliest time that a good processor i branches to Step 5. If i branched from Step 3.5b, then count,>2n/3, so for every good j, count,>n/3, so j reset B,=l in Step (3.5b) or (3.5~). Then by the above argument, all good processors that have not yet branched to Step 5 will output 1. Likewise, if i branched from Step 4.5a, then count,<n/3, so for every good j, count,<2n/3, so j reset B,=O in Step (4.5a) or (4.5c), so by the above argument, all good processors output 0.
All that remains to show is that BAp terminates in expected time 0( F( n)). I n each iteration of Steps I-4.5 the good processors end Step 2 in agreement with probability at least p, so the expected number of iterations is at most l/p. All good processors terminate, at the latest, on an iteration in which all good processors end Step 2 in agreement. QED As suggested in the proof, tihe good processors need not terminate simultaneously. In fact, Fischer and Lyn.ch [FL] prove that it is impossible to have a fast BA which guarantees that all processors finish in Ithe same round! However, we have seen that all good processors terminate at most one iteration after the first good processor terminates.
ACommon Coin Prc&xml
We have reduced the problem of reaching BA to finding an common coin protocol. How may one design a common coin protocol? Our method will be to consider the tallies in a "random electron". Kandom elections of a different flavor were used in the agreement protocols of Char, Merritt and Shmoys [CMS] and Dwork, Shmoys and Stockmeyer [DSS] to obtain a common coin in "more benevolent" scenarios. In these protocols, each player i chose a random value, r,, for himself; a common coin was computed from these values. A new idea in our protocol is to have the entire network participate in determining each r,. As a result, the adversary can not control the values of bad players. These cooperatively assigned values are then used to compute the common coin.
In our election, each player is both a voter and a candidate Unlike standard elections, a candidate chooses which votes he wishes to accept. Each player i uses Graded-VSS to share A secret votes, one for each candidate, chosen randomly and independently mod n. Each candidate must accept (both in the formal and informal sense!) a set of at least n-t votes. Subsequently, all secrets are recovered. The tar'ly for j is the sum of the votes j accepted, reduced mod n. If some candidate has tally 0, the common coin is 0; if no candidate has tally 0, the output bit is 1.
Remark 5: A tally may not be well-defined if it; includes unrecoverable votes. When the processors run Recover on unrecoverable secrets, good processors may output different values. Thus, any candidate accepting unrecoverable votes must be scratchelri during Vote. This is the utility of the three-level acceptance. Every vote acazpted by a good candidate is acknowledged by all good players, and is hence known to be recoverable.
A bad player may select his votes non-randomly. However, each candidate must accept at least n-t votes, some of which were shared by good players and hence were picked randomly, hence the tally of every candidate is random.
Remark 0: If each of k independent random variables (in our application, tallies) has probability q/n of being 0, then the probability that none are 0 IS ( '1-q/n)', which approximates e-'g/n for large n. We sh:all state, without proof, bounds on such quantities valid for any n24. Theorem 7: Let (Share,Ctaded-.Decide,Recouer) be a Graded-VSS running in time F( n) on common input n. Then there exists a .27-fair common coin protocol running in time F( n)+0( I). If the Graded-VSS is rresilient, then the common coin is min( l/3, r)-resilient.
Proof: Consider the following pair of protocols. We consider as common inputs n and k =loglOn*.
pmtocol Vote Common Inputs:n,t<n/3,t Private Input for Every Player i: None
Step 1: (Every Player i) For each 15 j<n, randomly and independently choose s,,E [ 0. n-11. For each 15 h <_ n, for each 15 j<n, run Share and Graded-Decide on common input n,h .k .n, j; when h -;i, use s,, as the private input, Let accept*, denote the output of Graded-Decide. (Note: h IS the dealer of the secret; the fourth common input, n, IS the number of possible secrets; j is an execution label, denoting that this vote is for j. The Graded-VSS surely utilizes retamed private inputs, but they are only accessed by Recover, hence they do not appear in the code for Vote; we treat the Graded-VSS 89 a blackbox satisfying Definition 6.)
Step 2: (Every Player i) Let A, denote accept, for each j. Let L&=(Al ,,..., A.,). Crude-Cast LI&.
Step 2.5: (Every Player i) For each j, if j's Grade-Caet is accepted, and (mtx (Ah,-accept*,) <2) and (Ah, =2 for at least n-t values of h), set condidete,=2; otherwise, set candidate,=O.
Step 3: (Every Player i) For each h and j, run Recover with retained common variables n, h,n, j. Let ud, be the outplt.
Step 3 We shall denote the secret shared with common input n,h,k,n,j by (stored) secret h,j. The Grade-Cast of List, indicates which votes are to be included in i's tally, namely, each secret h,i for which A*,=2.
A good player i keeps candidate j by setting candidate,=2 iff three conditions are met:
(1) i accepts the Grade-Cast of j's list;
(2) i acknowledges every secret which j accepts; (3) j accepts at least n-t votes.
If any of these fail, i scratches candidate j by set trng candidate, =O. We say that j is totally scratched of all good players scratch j; otherwise, j is in the running. If j 1s in the runnmg, then j's list accepts at least n-t votes, all of which are recoverable, and all good players acknowledge the Grade-Cast of j's list, For every pair of good players (i,j), i accepts j's Grade-Cast, j accepts all secrets dealt by good players, and i acknowledges every secret j accepts, so candidate,=2 (i.e., i keeps j).
Let A be any r-adversary actrng on Vote. Let E be the event that for every i in the running, every secret that i accepted is truly recoverable.
Claim 1: E occurs with probability at least .9
This follows from property (3) of Graded-VSS and our choice of k For each A, for each j, with probability at most 2-k 5 1/10n2, secret h,j is acknowledged by some good processor yet is not truly recoverable. The probabilrty that this happens for at least one of the n2 secrets shared in Vote is at most n* times greater, namely .l. Thus, with probability at least .9, this never happens. In this case, for any h,j, if Ah,=2 and secret h,j is not truly recoverable, then every good player set accepth,=O, and hence j is totally scratched.
Claim 2: When E occurs, for every j, there exists a value tally, such that for each good player i, tally,, is either tally, or 0 Any good player g that scratches j sets tally,@ All good players that keep j acknowledge a common List, =A, , , .. , .4, , ,  Since E occurs, every recoverable secret is truly recoverable, and hence there exists a value VA, such that UJ,=V~, for every good player i that acknowledges secret !I, j If i keeps j, then i acknowledges all secrets j accepts, so tab,= I C ck, k:A -2 AI I mod n = [*:E_~vI,] mod n; this sum is the same for all good processors i that keep j.
Let jr,..., j. denote all players in the running in increasing order of identrties. Let El denote the event that tallyIl#O for all 15 d <f , and let pi be the probability of E/ Claim 3: Assume E holds. Then for each 111 50, the conditional probability of E, given Efml is between I-.97/n and l-1.03/n.
Let j=i/.
Since j accepted at least n-t votes, there is a good player h such that Ah,=2.
The unpredictability property of Graded-VSS guarantees that the probability that A predicts vh, before Recover is run on common retained input n,h,n, j is between .99/m and 1.01/m. In particular, unpredictability still applies even if the network runs Recover for every secret g,i except for h,j To make our argument precise, we define a (contrived) protocol Vote' es follows. The only difference between Vote' and Vote is that in Vote', if player i receives a message "Delay ( Ir , j) " sent by any processor in Step 2, i will not run Recover for secret (h, j) until (an added) Step 4. (Although no i should send a "Delay" message.) An adversary A acting on Vote' can easily arrange that all secrets except /I, j are recovered in
Step 3, by having a bad player distribute "Delay (h ,j)" in Step 2. A can compute all tallies other than j's, and x = uk,-tally,, in skp 3 of Vote'.
Vote and Vote' are ldentrcal tnrougn 3tep 2. AlI tallies are determined by the end of Step 2 in Vote. and hence in Vote' as well. Thus, if A acts the same through
Step 2 in both, the probabilities of E, are the same in both cases. We proceed by induction. Assume that the conditional probability of Ed given Ed-1 is between )-.97/n and 1-1.03/n for ljd</ Then pfml is at least (l-1 03/n)f-1 and at most (l-.97/n)'-'. Since o<f<n, 1/3<p,-,<l.
A actmg on Vote' may predrct "k, as follows. When El-, occurs, A outputs z Notrce that ( x==v~) -++( toUyl=O)+Ef does not occur. Given ElmI, E, IS equivalent to the event zfvk,.
We denote the conditional probability of E, given El-1 by c,=p,/p,-,.
When E,-, does not occur, A outputs a random number mod n; this prediction is correct with probability l/n. Overall, A's prediction is correct with
By unpredictability, this probability is between +99/n and 1.01/n. Since p,>1/3, ICI-l/n [<.03/n, as was to be shown.
Thus, the probability that no player in the running has tally 0 is at least (l-1.03/n)". Since a In, p,, >( l-1.03/n)" > .3. When this happens, all good players output 1. The probability that no good player has tally 0 is at most (l-.97/n)'-'; since t<n/3, this is at most ( l-.97/n)2"b< .7. Thus, the probability that some good player has tally 0 is at least .3. When this happens, all good players output 0. Finally, we observe that E occurs with probability at least .9, so the coin is .27-fair. QED Remark 7: Protocol Vote may be used to randomly select a leader by constdering the candidate w1t.h the lowest My; whenever this belongs to a good player, all good players output the same leader. By taking votes mod n*, this happens with probability at least 2/3. One application of this is in a more efficient implementation of our protocol.
The BA Prcatowl
We now recall the theorems we have proven, and put them together to exhibit a BA protocol running in constant expected time with constant resiliency.
Lemma 3:
Grade-Cast IS a l/3-resilient Graded-broadcast protocol.
Recall that Grade-Cast has 4 Steps, three of which take 1 round each; the last is "free" Theorem 4: FreeVSS is a l/+resilient Graded-VSS.
Overall, FreeVSS has 2 Grade-Cast instructions, 3 steps which require 1 round each, and 3 free steps, hence its running time is 9 rounds. be a Graded-VSS running in time F(n) on common input n. Then there exists a .27-fair common coin protocol running in time F(n)+O( 1). If tire Graded-VSS is rresilient, then the common coin is min( 1/3,r)-resilient.
Protocol Vote, as constructed by the proof of Theorem 7 by using FreeVSS and Grade-Cast, has running time 12 rounds and is L/4-resilient.
'Theorem 6: Let P be a common coin protocol. Let F( n) be the running time of P when the common input is n. Then there exists a BA protocol B&Z with expected running time 0( F( n)). If P is r-resilient, then the resilience of BAp is min( 1/3,r).
Rotocol BAvot,, as constructed by the proof of Theorem 6, is l/4-resilient The (expected number of iterations is at most l/.27 Each iteration ties 15 rounds, so the expected running time is at most 1+ ( 15/.27) < 56 rounds.
In demonstrating a cur&ant expected time BA, we have sacrificed resiliency and efficiency for simplicity In [Fl] , we seek the most resilient and efficient v'ersions of the protocol; here we shall list the results.
Improved
Versions of the Protocol An optimally resilient protocol is obtained by sub stituting a l/&resilient Graded-VSS in Vote. We present such a Graded-VSS, FuafVSS in IFl]. (Moreover, in FaefVSS, every recoverable secret is truly recoverable 1. We also exhibit vast reductions in the expected running time. A key step is the observation that the processors may store common cams; a stired common coin corresponds to running all but the last step of Vote. Thus, all coins after the first are output in one round each. A closer analysis of F'ofe, and a better choice of parameters yields a common coin of fairness exceeding 2/S. The full power of Grade-Cast is often more than is needed; it oftan suffices to run just the first 2 rounds of Grade-Coat. Finally, BAp itself may be shortened by enabling the processors to determine that agreement has been reached without adding predefined coins. Using these improvements, the exlpected time to reach agreement (for resiliency l/3) is at most 13 for the i9rst agreement and 10 for subsequent agreements. For resiliency l/4, we can reduce these to 11 and 8, respectively.
If processors begin with pre-established schema for signing messages, then there exists a l-resilient BA protocol (Dolev and Strong IDS] ) running in time 0(t). In [Fl] , we exhibit a l/Bresilient BA protocol running in constant expected time in thus scenario. The a,pproa& is an extension of the algorithm presented here, although there are various subtleties in extending the p:rotocols to resiliency l/2; for example, a cryptographic Graded-VSS is necessary. No sublinear time algorithms are known for resiliency exceeding l/2.
Asynchronous
Byzantine Agmernent
In an asynchronous system, messages sent by good processors may experience arbitrary (but fini,te) delays We assume that the adversary schedules the arrivals of all messages. Fischer, Lync'h and Paterson [E'LPJ show that no deterministic BA prolacol can tolerate even a single non-malicious fault in an asynchronous network! The only previously known asynchronous BA from scratch is a probabilistic protocol of Ben-Or [B] . The protocol runs in constant time for t=0( &). but has expected running time 2'(n) when t=8( n). In [Fl] , we show how to modify the synchronous protocol to work in an asynchronous system. We present proticols running in constant expected time. Without cryptography, our protocol is l/4-resilient; with cryptography, we regain optimal resiliency l/3.
Tke Simulation of Private Channels
In IFll, we show that the existence of an unopprozimable tr lpdoor predicate implies that a network without private channels may simulate a network with private channels at the cost of one additional round and a small multiplicative factor m communication and computational complexity.
Namely, we construct a compiler which transforms any protocol designed for a private channel network into a protocol running on a network without private channels. Anything which processors accomplish in the original protocol is accomplished m the compiled protocol; anything which an adversary can learn on the compiled protocol could have been learned by an adversary acting on the original protocol Although it may be intuitive that encryption can hide the contents of messages just aa well as private channels, the proof is non-trivial.
Theorem 8 ([Fl)):
A ssume there exists an accessible unapproximable trapdoor predicate. Let N be a network, and m an identical network in .which no channels are private Then there exists a polynomial Q and a compiler C which, on input any protocol P to be run on N, outputs a protocol P running on fl such that 1. The (expected) running time of $ is essentially one round longer than that of P 2. If the communication and computational complexities of P are bounded by X, then the complexities of P are bounded by Q( X,k) (where k is a security parameter).
3. For any polynomial-time r-adversary A which acts on P, there exists a polynomial-time r-adversary A which acts on P, such that the probability distributions on the outputs of all processors and x acting on P are indistinguishable from the outputs of all processors and A acting on P.
Open Problems
We have constantrtime, optimally-resilient protocols for the following scenarios:
(1) Synchronous network with private channels, computationafly unbpounded adversary.
(2) Asynchronous network, cryptography allowed (computationally bounded adversary).
The following questions remarn open
(1) Is there a fast BA from scratch for a synchronous or asynchronous network, without assuming private channels, robust against a computationally unbounded adversary?
(2) Is there a fast BA from scratch for an asynchronous network for resiliency exceeding l/4, robust against a computationally unbounded adversary?
